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The Economic Impact of Stadia and Teams: The Case of Minor League Baseball

Abstract
This paper uses an extensive unique dataset to investigate the justification of government
subsidies for minor league baseball teams and stadiums by measuring pecuniary gains in a local
economy. Specifically, a dynamic panel data model incorporating 238 Metropolitan Statistical
Areas that hosted affiliated or independent minor league teams between 1985 and 2006 shows
that AAA teams, A+ teams, AA stadiums, and rookie stadiums are all associated with significant
positive effects on the change in local per capita income. The presence of positive effects is
strikingly different from decades of non-positive results at the major league level.
JEL Classification Codes: L83, H23
Keywords: economic impact, minor league baseball, efficiency, sports stadiums
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I. INTRODUCTION
Advocates of public stadium subsidies claim professional sports teams produce positive
production and consumption externalities in a local economy. Theoretically, these externalities
should manifest themselves through pecuniary increases in incomes, jobs, and taxes that could
offset the public sector contribution, thus justifying government expenditures on efficiency
grounds. Although research on major league sports shows these pecuniary effects are nonpositive (e.g. Coates & Humphreys, 1999; Miller, 2002; Baade, Baumann, & Matheson, 2008)
little empirical inquiry has been conducted in other sports that receive public subsidies.
A stadium building boom that resulted in a dramatic increase in both the cost and public
contribution towards minor league baseball stadiums provides an interesting context in which to
conduct economic policy research. Based on the unsupported claims of major league teams,
minor league baseball team owners also maintain ex ante that new ballparks will increase
employment, tax revenues, and other private economic development. Yet, no research has
substantiated or refuted these assertions at the minor league level.
The purpose of this research is to remedy this gap in the literature by determining the
effects of minor league teams and their stadiums on local economies. An extensive database is
used to investigate claims of positive pecuniary benefits by analyzing changes in local per capita
income in 238 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Micropolitan Statistical Areas
(MiSAs) that hosted minor league teams between 1985 and 2006.
This research acknowledges that minor league baseball is not a homogenous good.
Structurally diverse classifications imply differential contributions to local economic well-being.
The primary purpose of this paper is to investigate whether differences exist between minor
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league baseball and Major League Baseball (MLB), between independent and affiliated teams,
and within affiliated classifications (AAA, AA, A, and rookie).
While this research is primarily driven by the need to provide ex post analysis of
government investment in minor league baseball, a variety of other contributions are made.
First, the smaller towns where minor league baseball teams are located help avoid an
econometric issue that has plagued major league research. Because major league teams are
located in roughly the 50 largest metro areas, there is a collinearity problem between population
and the presence of a team. On the other hand, between 1980 and 2007 there were 269 metro
areas that hosted a minor league baseball team with 2006 population ranging from 15,469 to 18.8
million. Thus, minor league baseball offers the opportunity to dramatically increase not only the
variance in population but also the size of the sample. Next, although Baade et al. (2008) point
out that the enormity of major metropolitan areas makes it difficult to find effects due to normal
fluctuations in the regional economy, this problem should be partially alleviated in minor league
baseball because metropolitan areas are generally smaller. Because the effect of a team may be
smaller as well it may be theoretically ambiguous, ex ante, whether minor league teams are a
larger or smaller portion of the economy than major league teams are. With 269 metro areas in
the sample, at minimum there should be a wide variation in the degree to which teams are either
a large or small part of the local economy.
Third, the minor league baseball context extends the current major league literature to a
new and relevant segment of U.S. sports. Although there were several critical, but noneconometric, studies on the potential for minor league teams to affect local economics in the
mid-1990’s (Baade & Sanderson, 1997b; Colclough, Daellenbach, & Sherony, 1994; Johnson,
1995; Rosentraub & Swindell, 1991), it is only in recent years that econometric interest in minor
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league baseball has begun (e.g. Cebula, Toma, & Carmichael, 2009; Gitter & Rhoads, 2010,
2011; Winfree, 2009) although none of these studies focus on economic impact. In 1997, Baade
and Sanderson claimed that econometric analysis of minor league baseball was not possible
because of the non-existence of data for small communities. Fortunately, the opposite is now
true and data is so freely available, even for small communities, that this research contains all but
five minor league teams that played in the U.S. in a 22-year period.
Finally, this research also helps inform the current debate on public funding for minor
league stadiums by evaluating the veracity of claims made by stadium proponents. With
hundreds of millions of public dollars spent each year on minor league baseball stadiums, the
economic effects of teams on communities have important policy implications.
II. Theory and Literature
Common arguments for public subsidization involve claims that teams generate positive
production externalities that result in economic growth effects in the local economy. Indeed the
classic claim is that the bars and restaurants surrounding a stadium will be full of new patrons
spending more money and generating new sales tax revenues. These busy establishments will
hire more employees or raise salaries for existing employees. In short, the positive production
externalities are claimed to affect multiple aspects of a local economy. Yet, the vast majority of
academic research in this area has found non-positive effects on income (Baade & Dye, 1990;
Baade, 1996; Coates & Humphreys, 1999, 2001, 2003; Matheson & Baade, 2005; Lertwachara &
Cochran, 2007), employment (Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, & Mullins, 1994; Baade, 1996;
Baade & Sanderson, 1997a; Hudson, 1999; Miller, 2002; Coates & Humphreys, 2003), sales tax
revenues (Rosentraub & Nunn, 1978; Coates & Depken, 2006; Baade et al., 2008), and spending
(Zipp, 1996).
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Since the study at hand operationalizes pecuniary gains through a change in per capita
income, a more thorough discussion of the major league research on income is warranted. To
begin, Baade and Dye (1990) found an insignificant effect of a new stadium on MSA personal
income in nine major league cities between 1965 and 1983. Baade (1996) extended this to
include all major league cities between 1958 and 1987 and still found insignificant results for all
cities except Indianapolis (positive) and Baltimore (negative). Using a reduced form equation
but obtaining similar results, Coates and Humphreys (1999) analyzed all major league cities
between 1969 and 1994 and found the effect of a new team or stadium was insignificant although
there were a few significant results. For example, the entrance of a basketball franchise
increased per capita income by $67 but a new basketball arena decreased it by $73 for an overall
loss in per capita income. Finally, Santo (2005) created a more modern dataset (1984-2001), but
utilized Baade and Dye’s (1990) original methodology, and found many positive effects of
stadiums and teams on local area income, although a few negative effects were found as well.
Santo believes his results, which conflict so strongly with previous research, result from different
characteristics of new modern stadiums as well as their geographical locations in urban centers.
The positive results obtained by Santo are not necessarily an anomaly. Teams can
theoretically affect income if they generate substantial new spending by out-of-area residents or
discourage residents from spending outside the local economy. Both of these are more likely to
occur in geographically isolated metro areas, especially small cities with few other entertainment
options. Professional teams can also affect income if they effectively utilize their stadium to host
a high number of events that draw new visitor spending, induce little or no crowding out effects,
and generate low levels of leakages.
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Instead of the claimed positive pecuniary gains to a local economy, the presence of a
team or a stadium leads to neutral or negative changes primarily due to leakages and substitution.
Team owners, players, concessionaires, and other recipients of consumer expenditures tend to
remove those dollars from the local economy (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000, 2002). Because
professional sports teams spend approximately 60% of their revenues on player payroll, a
considerable amount of new spending flows out of the regional economy due to high tax rates,
high savings rates, and the non-local permanent residences of players.
Crowding out can take the form of locals not venturing near a stadium when a game is
taking place, normal business or leisure travelers avoiding a local economy when a large event is
occurring, or local area residents purposefully leaving the local economy to avoid a mega-event.
In all of these cases, normal local economic activity is reduced below its regular level, meaning
any gains from an event must offset the loss in order for the community to simply break even.
Finally, considerable research at the major league level (Coates & Humphreys, 2001,
2003; Matheson & Baade, 2005) reveals that when consumers face a budget constraint, spending
on sports is simply a substitute for spending in other higher multiplier local leisure activities
(Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000).
III. Minor League Baseball Context
Minor League Baseball, previously called the National Association of Professional
Baseball Leagues, oversees all minor league teams that are affiliated with major league
franchises. In 1990, MLB began decreasing its financial contributions to affiliated minor league
baseball teams. At the same time, new stadium requirements mandated minor league teams to
dramatically renovate or build new stadiums in order to retain their major league affiliations.
The increased financial independence of minor league teams, coupled with more stringent
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stadium requirements and the dramatically increased costs of purchasing a franchise, resulted in
an increase in the already booming minor league stadium market, higher prices for new stadiums,
and larger stadium contributions from communities throughout the U.S.
Independent leagues are not governed by Minor League Baseball, are free to set their
own schedules, sign their own players, and were unaffected by the 1990 stadium requirements.
Yet independent leagues have always struggled with financial viability because they have had to
cover the entire portion of their expenses with no assistance from major league teams. Despite
lower player talent than affiliated teams, independent teams must rely more on player talent,
wins, promotions, and marketing to drive attendance and therefore revenues to the team. The
result is independent leagues tend to exhibit more market volatility, as evidenced in Table 1, and
stay in a city only 25% as long as an affiliated franchise, on average.

<insert Table 1 here>

Affiliated minor league baseball teams are not a singular entity. Minor League Baseball
governs 19 different minor leagues categorized into classifications where AAA is the highest
followed by AA, A, and rookie leagues. Table 2 summarizes some of the differences between
classifications for all of the teams that played in 2006. The A leagues were at one time broken
down into advanced A (or A+), A, and short-season A (or A-). Although professional baseball
officially did away with the distinction, its use is important in this research because rookie and
A- leagues play “short seasons,” which run from June through the end of August, and include
roughly half as many games as other classifications. Since the amount of new visitor spending in
a local economy is a function of the number of games played, these short-season leagues have
fewer opportunities to generate positive economic effects. Table 2 also makes clear that some
classifications (AA and independent) face steep competition from major league teams while
others (rookie) face none.

<insert Table 2 here>
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Similar to the major leagues, minor league teams often move because of excess demand
for teams generated from league cartels that limit the supply of teams. In this context, cities
compete for teams and contribute millions of dollars for new facilities without any evidence as to
whether minor league teams and stadiums are wise investments or not. If major league teams
have non-positive effects on local per capita income, what can be expected at the minor league
level?
Minor league baseball is major league baseball on a small scale. Teams play shorter
seasons in smaller ballparks that tend to be located in smaller cities with lower per capita
incomes. Minor league teams have operating budgets that pale in comparison to their major
league affiliates, they employ fewer people, the salaries they pay are much smaller, and the jobs
are mostly seasonal (Johnson, 1991, 1995). Although major leagues often import over 50% of
their total budget from revenue sharing and lucrative national television contracts, the only
financial inflows attributable to minor league teams are the player salaries paid by major league
affiliates. Even these payments are absent in the case of independent leagues. In addition, the
minor leagues have lower levels of media exposure and brand association, decreased league
longevity, more frequent team moves, shorter seasons, and lower quality players producing
lower quality contests. If the effect of a major league team on income is insignificant or
negative, the minor league results should be more so.
In spite of this inauspicious expectation, it is important to note that minor league baseball
is not a homogenous product. Affiliated teams should have a more positive effect than
independent teams because of higher quality players, stronger history, fewer league and team
movements, and the benefits of affiliation in branding, increasing attendance, and generating
media exposure. Likewise, within classifications the quality of play, season length, population,
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substitutes, and longevity in a market are distinctly different. For example, AAA and AA teams
benefit from large populations (as a proxy for demand), little competition from MLB, and longer
seasons in larger stadiums. Given these conditions, it is expected AAA and AA teams will have
the least negative effect while A and rookie teams are expected to have a more negative effect on
local per capita income.
Finally, minor league team owners routinely claim that their product is a local leisure
activity, not a sporting contest (Johnson, 1995). If this is truly the case, then a comparison to
MLB may be less appropriate than a stand-alone evaluation of the degree to which minor league
baseball can generate new visitor spending.
IV. PECUNIARY ANALYSIS
Claims of economic growth effects are tested by measuring the impact of a minor league
team and its stadium on levels of local per capita income. The following section provides a
description of the sample, the model, its variables, and descriptive statistics, followed by the
statistical method employed, results, and robustness checks.
Sample
The data collection process began by identifying all of the teams that played minor league
baseball between 1980 and 2006. This included teams in 3 AAA leagues, 3 AA leagues, 7 A
leagues, 2 advanced rookie leagues, and 22 independent leagues. Of all of the affiliated and
independent minor league teams that played in this period, only five were located in cities that
are not part of an MSA or MiSA. Likewise, teams playing in 19 Canadian cities were not
included in the sample.
The unit of analysis for this research is not a team, but the MSA or MiSA in which each
team plays. Thus, 4,495 team-year observations were sorted into over 200 corresponding metro
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areas. A team’s MSA is most reflective of its market size and drawing potential when the
stadium is located near the urban core. If a team is located in a very far suburb of a large
metropolitan area the MSA fails to accurately represent the market area of the team and the city
or county data becomes more appropriate. For example, in 2003, the Chicago MSA hosted five
Independent teams and one A team. The Joliet JackHammers, Cook County Cheetahs,
Schaumburg Flyers, Gary SouthShore RailCats, Kenosha Mammoths, and Kane County Cougars
are located 46, 25, 30, 32, 57, and 39 miles, respectively, from Chicago. While the Chicago
MSA had a 2003 population of 9.3 million, the county population for each team was 581,199,
5.3 million, 5.3 million, 484,750, 155,729, and 455,672, respectively. Therefore, because the
MSA was chosen as the geographical unit of measure for this analysis, there were simply some
cases where minor league teams, although technically within the boundaries of the MSA, were
not appropriately described by MSA data. Thus, to prevent a small area with a population of
155,729 people located 57 miles from Chicago as being erroneously treated as a 9.3 million
person metropolitan area, the following 18 “big” MSAs were removed from the sample:
Baltimore, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami,
New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Raleigh, Riverside-San Bernardino, Seattle, St. Louis,
Tampa, and Washington D.C.1
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An F-test was performed to statistically test the exclusion of these MSAs. The restricted

model included all 256 MSAs while the unrestricted model was a sum of a) the 18 big MSAs
and b) the 238 non-big MSAs. F(51, 5526) = 1.639 is significant at p < 0.01 and confirms the
big and non-big MSAs cannot be well specified with a single coefficient. Thus, the
unrestricted model is preferred and the big MSAs are removed from this sample.
10

The first five years of the dataset were ultimately truncated to create honeymoon
variables (as described in the following section). This resulted in the loss of 12 metro areas
which, in addition to the removal of 18 Big metro areas, ultimately provided a final sample of
238 metro areas in the years between 1985 and 2006.
Model and Variables
In order to make a clear comparison between minor league and major league effects, this
research uses a linear reduced form model first developed by Coates and Humphreys (1999) to
determine if the presence or absence of a team or its stadium affects the level of per capita
income in an economy. Specifically,
yjt = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt

(1)

where:
yjt is the real per capita personal income in MSA j at time t
β1 is a vector of local market parameters to be estimated
Xjt is a vector of local market variables for each MSA j at time t
β2 is a vector of sporting parameters to be estimated
Zjt is a vector of franchise and stadium variables in MSA j at time t
υj is an MSA j specific fixed-effect
μt is a time t specific fixed-effect
εjt is a random disturbance
The model uses city fixed-effects (υj) to control for all time-invariant characteristics that
are specific to a city and that contribute to levels of real per capita income. Likewise, a time
disturbance (μt) captures all city-invariant factors that are specific to a year that affect per capita
income.
The dependent variable is real per capita income for each MSA or MiSA adjusted for
inflation using the consumer price index calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (base year
2006). Real per capita income, population, and employment data were obtained from the
Regional Economic Information System produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.

11

To control for variability unique to each local MSA, a series of local market parameters
are included in the model. Again, to be clear, these parameters were chosen to replicate, as
closely as possible, the model developed by Coates and Humphreys (1999) for clear comparison
of major and minor league results. A lagged dependent variable serves to evaluate recent
changes in the local industrial life cycle and the associated effects on income as suggested by
product cycle theory (Vernon, 1966). A rate of employment variable is constructed as a proxy
for labor demand and should positively affect local per capita income.
Change in population is a local market variable included to measure growth in a local
market. This is especially relevant since many small towns that host minor league teams are
actually shrinking. The theoretical relationship between population and per capita income is
ambiguous though. Population growth can increase the labor supply which will drive down
wages and negatively affect local per capita income. Conversely, population growth can
increase the demand for products thus increasing labor demand and positively affecting local per
capita income.
Stadium capacity measures the degree to which a community can utilize and consume the
minor league sporting product. Presumably, a greater ability to consume sport induces a greater
potential to generate income effects in the local economy.
The popularity of a parent club should positively affect a minor league team’s ability to
produce positive economic outcomes in a community to the degree to which it drives visiting
consumers. The quality of affiliation is conceptualized as a function of the size of the MLB
market and the popularity of its MLB team thus, the major league parent club’s current MSA
population is multiplied by a two year moving average of the previous season win percents (the
robustness checks, below, investigate alternative specifications of this variable).
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Finally, the number of professional major league teams in baseball, basketball, hockey,
and football are controls that should have negative coefficients due to their previously
established effects on local economies.
An important hypothesis is that minor league baseball at different levels of play exhibits
different characteristics. Thus, the minor league variables differentiate between different league
levels, affiliated v. independent status, and newness of team and a stadium in a community.
The actual number of teams at each level of affiliation is included instead of a presence
dummy because minor league baseball can have multiple teams at the same level in the same
MSA. For example, the Tampa-St. Petersburg MSA has hosted four A+ teams from the mid1900’s to 2000 including the Clearwater Phillies, Dunedin Blue Jays, St. Petersburg Cardinals
(later renamed the St. Petersburg Devil Rays), and the Tampa Yankees. Affiliated teams should
have a more positive effect on income than independent teams although both may be negative.
Previous research assumed the newness or “honeymoon” effect of a new stadium lasted
ten years. More recent research by Clapp and Hakes (2005) and Leadley and Zygmont (2005)
suggests the honeymoon effect is considerably shorter. This research uses a five-year period to
dummy the effect of a new stadium. In other words, the variable takes on the value of 1 in the
year a new stadium is built and the four subsequent years. The stadium newness dummy should
be positive.
Identical coding was used for an entry dummy that measures the newness of a team and
an exit dummy that measures the years after a team leaves to capture what sport sociologists
Foster & Hyatt (2007) have identified as the euphoria surrounding a new team and the despair
associated with a team leaving. The entry coefficient is expected to be positive and the exit
negative.
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for each variable described above.
<insert Table 3 here>
Analysis
The breadth and depth of this dataset necessitates careful examination of its adherence to
the classical regression model assumptions. The degree to which the data deviate from the
expected form will dictate the best estimator to be used. To begin, econometric investigation
revealed no evidence of multicollinearity in the data using either variance inflation factors or the
correlation matrix.
Visual inspection with augmented component-plus-residual plots indicates the presence
of heteroskedastic errors. A likelihood ratio (LR) test (2 (237) = 4439.61, p < 0.0001) rejects the
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Because this test is sensitive to the assumption of
normality in the errors, an additional heteroskedasticity test is computed. Greene (2000, p. 598)
developed a modified Wald statistic to test for group wise heteroskedasticity in the context of a
fixed effects model. The Greene test (2 (238) = 20640.78, p < 0.0001) also rejects the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity suggesting each MSA has its own error variance.
Using Wooldridge’s (2002, p. 282–283) test for autocorrelation in panel-data models (F(1,
237)

= 9.72, p = 0.002) the null hypothesis of no first order correlation is rejected. Similarly, a

panel unit root test developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) fails to reject the null of unit root
series (p = 0.925).
The usual test for contemporaneous correlation in panel data models, the Breusch-Pagan
LM test (1980), has been shown to over-reject when cross-sectional units (N) are greater than or
equal to the number of time periods (T), especially with T between 20 and 30 (Pesaran, 2004).
In this dataset, T=22. Pesaran’s (2004) cross sectional dependence (CD) test was developed to
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correct this problem as well as to handle unit root dynamic heterogeneous panels with short T
and large N, as is the case in this research. The Pesaran test (2 (238) = 4.466, p < 0.0001) rejects
the null hypothesis that error terms are independent across cross-sections in the same year.
Finally, because minor league teams move with a much higher frequency than major
league teams it is possible that moves take place from cities with lower per capita incomes to
those with higher per capita incomes. In addition, per capita income and population may be
positively correlated. This implies that larger or wealthier cities are more capable of sustaining a
minor league franchise and also implies the presence of a minor league team may be endogenous
in this model specification. Despite this common belief and concern, a Wu (1973)-Hausman
(1978) F-test fails to reject the null that each of the minor league presence variables is
exogenous. The implication of this is further explored in the discussion section.
Ultimately, this is a panel heteroskedastic, autocorrelated model with contemporaneous
correlation and a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. The lagged dependent
variable is a concern because its presence in a fixed effect model can generate parameter
estimates that are biased up to 20% even when the number of time units is as high as 30 (Judson
& Owen, 1999).
Although the Monte Carlo evidence in Judson and Owen (1999) suggests that a
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator is preferable to a Least Squares Dummy
Variables estimator (also known as a fixed-effects model) in the case of a dynamic panel data
model it cannot be used when dummy variables are 0 for almost all or 1 for almost all
observations (Roodman, 2009). In this research most of the variables of interest are of this type
resulting in a situation where a GMM estimator cannot be used. The other common alternative, a
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Parks-Kmenta estimator requires T ≥ N in the case of contemporaneous correlation, a situation
that does not exist in this data.
Thus, to obtain efficient and unbiased estimates, the original model,
yjt = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt

(1)

is first differenced,
yjt - yjt-1 = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + υj + μt + εjt - β1Xjt-1 - β2Zjt-1 - υj - μt-1 - εjt-1

(2)

and when simplified,
yjt - yjt-1 = β1 (Xjt - Xjt-1) + β2 (Zjt - Zjt-1) + (μt - μt-1) + (εjt - εjt-1)

(3)

eliminates autocorrelation, explicit fixed effects, and the correlation of the lagged dependent
variable with the disturbances. Next, a panel corrected standard error estimator is applied to (3)
to account for any panel level heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. This
extension of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors accounts for the panel
structure of the data and in Monte Carlo simulations is more efficient than OLS standard errors
(Beck & Katz, 1995). To be clear, although the system has been first differenced, equations (1)
and (3) show that the parameter interpretations are exactly the same as before first differencing.
Results
The nature of multiple league classifications and the associated hypotheses necessitates a
model with a fairly large number of variables. Yet, often more parsimonious models are equally
informative. Since one of the research questions involves the simple distinction between
independent and affiliated teams, a simplified regression is first run with these variables and a
single dummy for any new stadium in a market (see Model 1 in Table 4). Neither affiliated nor
independent teams are significant.

<insert Table 4 here>
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Model 2 was run with a more detailed breakdown of affiliated teams to address the
differences between classifications. Model 3 tested this further stratification and a Wald test
confirmed (p = 0.022) that the distinction between A+, A, and A- was significantly different
from zero. Therefore, Model 4 implemented this stratification at both the team and stadium
level. Finally, Model 5 added entry and exit honeymoons. Model 5 is the fully specified model
and is used for discussion, although the results are strongly similar between the various models.
The R-squared value of 0.34 is lower than other similar major league research. But, since Rsquared is simply the fraction of unexplained variance in the model, it seems unsurprising that
238 minor league metro areas that range from a AAA metropolis to an Independent village have
more natural random unexplained variability than 40 nearly identical major league metro areas.
The first difference of the rate of employment is statistically significant and in the
expected direction. The first difference of the percent change in population is negative
suggesting, in this case, that the increasing labor supply is lowering wages. Two other control
variables, the first differences of stadium capacity and the quality of the major league parent
club, are statistically insignificant.
As mentioned in the previous section, although the model was first differenced, the
parameter interpretations have not changed. Thus, the mere presence of an AAA franchise is
associated with a $67.25 (p = 0.034) increase in per capita incomes, holding all else constant.
Similarly, an A+ franchise is associated with a $117.57 (p = 0.044) increase in per capita
income. The honeymoon period for stadiums at the AA (160.83, p = 0.033) and rookie level
(201.99, p = 0.032) also have significant impacts on per capita income. The entry and exit
honeymoon variables are all insignificant.
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Robustness Checks
Because the positive effects of minor league teams and stadiums at various classifications
are an unexpected outcome, three types of follow-up analyses were performed to ascertain the
robustness of the results: removing variables from the fully specified model, adding variables to
the fully specified model, and examining different samples of years and MSAs.
Two control variables, stadium capacity and major league affiliate quality, are
insignificant in the fully specified model. Various modifications of major league affiliate quality
were attempted including a three year moving average, only the previous season’s win percent,
and distance to the parent club. None of these controls for major league parent quality were
significant. In addition, the removal of both stadium capacity and MLB quality variables from
Model 5 did not affect the final results (see Table 5).
Similar to the insignificance of the control variables, a Wald test of the joint significance
failed to reject the null that the entry and exit variables were collectively equal to zero (p =
0.464). Despite their individual and collective insignificance, their exclusion from the model did
result in the AA stadium coefficient losing its significance.
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable based on the notion of a product cycle is
meant to capture the self-perpetuating tendencies of local industries and economies. Because
some economists view the use of a lagged dependent variable as theoretically tenuous, its
exclusion from the model was investigated. Both rookie and AA stadiums remained significant
while AAA and A+ teams moved just beyond the 5% level of significance. <insert Table 5 here>
In terms of adding variables to the fully specified model, controls for spring training
facilities and college stadiums were tested. Teams in Arizona and Florida on occasion use the
same stadium as those used by major league teams for spring training. It was theorized that these
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arrangements might result in additional benefits. The results were insignificant (p = 0.774).
Likewise, some teams share facilities with local colleges and universities. A dummy variable to
capture these arrangements was also insignificant (p = 0.881).
It should be noted that in all of the alternative specifications mentioned above, the other
parameters not reported in Table 5 were essentially the same.
The last category of robustness tests involves changing the sample. Attendance was not
included in the original model for several reasons, the most important of which was that
attendance data for all affiliated teams started only in 1992, thus reducing the sample size
considerably. No significance was found on attendance when the sample began in 1992.
Similarly, because the inclusion of entry and exit variables necessitated the removal of
five years of data, their exclusion from the model allowed more data points. Thus, when entry
and exit were removed and the sample was extended from 1980 to 2006, AAA teams and rookie
stadiums remained significant at p < 0.05 while A+ teams and AA stadiums performed less well
but still remained significant at p < 0.10.
In all of the new specifications, the AAA team and rookie stadium coefficients appear the
most stable. In fact, only the removal of the lagged dependent variable pushes the AAA team
coefficient to its highest p value of 0.057.
V. DISCUSSION
The discussion of these results begins by addressing the issue of potential endogeneity. It
is certainly plausible that population and the presence of a team are related to per capita income.
Indeed the popular press and our gut reactions tend to reinforce this belief. But as in major
league sports, teams move away when attendance and profits fall and they move to cities that
offer them new stadiums. But a new stadium is often a function of the local political landscape
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(Fort, 1999) and does not necessarily imply that higher per capita incomes or larger populations
increase the probability of obtaining a minor league team. This is supported by the WuHausman test of the data which confirms no endogeneity problems.
The only person to explicitly investigate the factors affecting minor league team location
used an ordered logit model to predict which cities were more likely to have teams at different
levels (Davis, 2006). His results showed that personal income has a positive effect on the
classification of the team in the city but he found the effect “surprising” (p. 263) and concluded
the effect was of “secondary importance” (p. 260) to population. Indeed, in Davis’ list of the 10
AAA cities with the lowest probability of having a team, those cities have actually hosted AAA
teams for an average of 35 years! This certainly calls into question the ability of the variables
(including per capita income) in Davis’ model to accurately predict which cities are more likely
to host a minor league baseball franchise. This may be due to the history of minor league
baseball; AAA and rookie franchises are extremely stable and often began their tenure in cities
over 20 years ago when the size and wealth of the city was significantly different than today.
Further research is needed to deeply clarify the issue, but for the purposes of this
research, there is enough evidence to suggest that endogeneity is not a problem in the current
minor league data set. Therefore, the results are discussed in terms of the concepts and theories
that might explain why minor league baseball could lead to changes in per capita income.
The positive effects of AAA teams, A+ teams, AA stadiums, and rookie stadiums on the
change in local per capita income are the most unexpected results from this analysis. As
discussed above, the results for AAA teams and rookie stadiums are the most robust to
alternative specifications and may be the most interesting outcomes of this inquiry.
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What explains these positive results? Conceptually, there are myriad reasons minor
league teams might have a more negative effect on local economies than their major league
counterparts do, including lower levels of national media exposure, shorter seasons, decreased
league longevity, more frequent moves, seasonal employment, lack of national revenue sharing,
and the small size of the business. Although these are undeniable features of minor league
baseball, they are simply descriptive features of the product. It is faulty to assume they are
sufficient to explain the relationship between the presence of a team and per capita income.
Instead, there are a considerable number of well-established conditions, discussed in the
Theory and Literature section, that could theoretically allow a minor league team to affect local
income. For instance, increased incomes can result if a team and its stadium generate new
spending by out-of-area visitors, discourage residents from spending outside the local economy,
have low levels of leakages, result in little or no crowding out effects, are located in a metro area
that is geographically isolated, have high stadium utilization rates, build a new stadium instead of
a replacement stadium, and locate the stadium in a central business district. Thus, these
conditions were compared with the raw data to draw some possible conclusions. Each will be
discussed below, in terms of the three primary objectives of the research.

Differences within Minor League Baseball
Teams
Baade and Sanderson (1997a) suggested that teams that are more geographically isolated
from other teams are likely to have a stronger regional following which will increase visitor
spending. At the AAA level, there are 34 MSAs that ever hosted an AAA team in the sample
period, 14 of which also hosted a major league team in a sport besides baseball. At the other end
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of the spectrum, seven are geographically isolated with no major league team in any sport within
a three hour drive. In these MSAs, the nature of their isolation drives visitor spending as does
the presence of their AAA team as the highest quality in-stadium baseball experience in the
region. Despite the fact that some minor league markets are home to popular university football
and basketball programs, serious or casual fans seeking a live professional baseball experience
have few or no other options in these markets. For example, Rosentraub and Swindell (1991)
report that the AAA team in Indianapolis (a city with two other professional teams) draws 60%
of its attendees from out of the area suggesting that visitors are specifically searching for an instadium baseball experience.
In regard to the 14 AAA MSAs with both major and minor league teams, the major
league experience may be so expensive that sports connoisseurs are drawn to the more
affordable, yet still relatively high quality, AAA game. Indeed, Gitter and Rhoads (2010) found
that increasing ticket prices for major league teams within 100 miles of a minor league team led
to increased minor league attendance.
Although the presence of a team at the AAA or A+ level is associated with positive
income effects, no team entry or exit dummy variables at any level are significant. It seems that
the smaller nature of minor league baseball diminishes any euphoria or despair effects associated
with team entry and exit, respectively. At first glance, it may appear odd that a presence variable
is significant while the corresponding entry variable is not. Yet, the entry variable is a
honeymoon meant to capture the additional newness effect that often generates fanfare, interest,
and attendance beyond the mere presence of the team. The insignificance of the entry
honeymoon simply means there are no effects beyond those already associated with the presence
of the team.
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Stadiums
In terms of the positive effects associated with minor league stadiums, the results show a
new stadium at the AA or rookie level is associated with an increase in the change in per capita
income during the year the stadium was built and the four subsequent years. Theoretically,
stadiums are more likely to affect per capita income if they are associated with other urban
redevelopment, have a high degree of utilization, and if they drive new visitor spending.
Ultimately, it is hard to conceive that an AA stadium that draws an average of 3,837
attendees 70 times a year or a rookie stadium that draws an average of 1,364 attendees 35 times a
year could possibly generate enough economic activity to create a measurable effect in the scope
of a larger regional economy. The first reason these two classifications have positive stadium
effects may be that these teams are more successful than others in utilizing the venue for
activities that drive economic activity by drawing visitors from outside the local economy.
When minor league ballparks are said to be built as community assets that host everything from
high school marching band contests to minor league games, perhaps these are the markets where
this holds true. For example, Hunter Wright Stadium in Kingsport, TN is home to the rookielevel Kingsport Mets. The stadium hosts the Mets, a baseball team from Gate City High School
in nearby Virginia, and the post-season tournaments for the Appalachian Athletic Conference
and Region XII of the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics.
If the positive effect is not due to high venue utilization, then it may be related to urban
redevelopment. Johnson (1998) points out that the location of a stadium can assist in
development by opening up industrial corridors, acting as the centerpiece of larger entertainment
projects, opening up land for new development, or driving infrastructure for future growth.
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Urban economists all recognize that stadiums themselves will not cause significant development,
rather, in communities with specific development logics and successful action plans a stadium
can serve as the driver for other development. In this light, it is possible that AA and rookie
MSAs have more successful redevelopment objectives.
A third reason is related to publicity. Johnson (1998) mentions that stadiums can also
serve to improve a community’s image if successfully exploited by the Chamber of Commerce,
local officials, tourist offices, economic development agencies, and other local government and
business organizations. When a large number of agencies act in concert to promote and market a
team or its stadium it increases the opportunities for economic gain. Thus, positive effects may
also be due to successful promotion of a minor league team or stadium. Rookie MSAs may be
more likely to engage in this type of publicity since the team and stadium may be the only
significant local attractions. For example, the official website for the town of Pulaski, VA, lists a
visit to historic Calfee Park as the number one item on its list of Things to Do.
In addition to high venue utilization, stadiums as development devices, and high local
publicity, there may be MSA-specific factors that induce the positive results. Rookie MSAs are
the stereotypical version of rural, small town America. Virtually all are geographically isolated
in deep Appalachian valleys or the open expanse of the rural west (Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and
Montana).
In addition to their isolated nature, rookie-level teams tend to be very stable. Team
movements are rare and most teams have a long tenure in their MSAs. These teams may in fact
be the “only show in town” which suggests a high level of psychological identification and may
explain why a new stadium generates such a powerful response. Similar to the honeymoon
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effect seen at major league parks, minor league fans and even the general public may be driven
to these parks for several years out of curiosity, popularity, and word of mouth.

Differences between Affiliated and Independent Leagues
Neither independent teams nor stadiums exhibited significant effects. These results are
not unexpected. Affiliated teams have a higher quality product, stronger team histories,
increased team and league longevity, the branding benefits of affiliation, and more national
media exposure. All of these factors positively affect intent to purchase and new visitor
spending.
As a whole, independent teams are drastically less stable than affiliated teams leading to
lower levels of regional interest, support, and visitor spending. In the period from 1980 to 2006,
independent teams stayed in an MSA an average of four years while affiliated franchises
averaged sixteen years (see Table 1). This is not to say that there aren’t shining examples of
successful independent teams only that, as a whole, independent teams are not associated with
gains in local area per capita income.

Differences between Major and Minor League Baseball
The bulk of academic inquiry has shown professional teams and stadiums have
predominately insignificant effects on local incomes. Therefore, the insignificance of the
majority of independent variables at the minor league level is consistent with previous research
at the major league level.
This study used a model as similar as possible to Coates and Humphreys (1999) so that
comparisons could be made between major and minor league sports. Although the unique
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structure of minor league baseball made it infeasible or impossible to include identical variables,
many of the same ones were used. In addition to a longer and more current dataset, this research
took advantage of new techniques in panel data analysis and used a different estimator.
Coates and Humphreys (1999) found insignificance for MLB stadium construction and
entrance coefficients whereas the minor league coefficients are significant in four instances (see
Table 6). The effect size of a minor league team is small, ranging from 0.7% of MSA per capita
income for a rookie stadium to 0.2% for an AAA team, but is similar to other minor league
research (Gitter & Rhoads, 2010; Winfree, 2009) that has also found small but strongly
significant effects.
In terms of capacity, Coates and Humphreys (1999) found 1000 additional seats in a
MLB stadium are associated with a small increase of $9.40 in real personal income. At the
minor league level, where stadium capacity is dramatically smaller than the major leagues, 1000
additional seats results in a $5 to $6 decrease in real personal income.
<Insert Table 6 here>
Ultimately, the nature of minor league baseball teams and stadiums may be that they
result in little or no crowding out effects, have low levels of leakages, and discourage residents
from spending outside the local economy. The small scale nature of minor league baseball
almost certainly guarantees little or no crowding out effects in local tourism establishments (e.g.
hotels) and minimal local crowding out effects in terms of locals changing travel and spending
habits to avoid pre- and post-game crowds2.

2

Yet a reviewer rightly points out that no research has yet confirmed whether this is true
so it is plausible for very small towns to experience crowding out, even with low attendance
numbers.
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Minor league teams and stadiums may cause few leakages for two different reasons.
First, minor league baseball salaries are so low that most players earn enough for basic
sustenance so that little if any leaves the local economy. Second, in cases of rural towns and
geographic isolation, the presence of a team or stadium may actually discourage residents from
spending outside the local economy. If minor league baseball is one of only a few local
entertainment options, having a team may inspire residents to stay and enjoy their leisure locally
as opposed to traveling away to find another alternative. In fact, other local entertainment
options such as movies most certainly have a higher propensity to leak than does minor league
baseball.
Although this research was not specifically designed to explain why minor league teams
and stadiums might have positive effects on local incomes, the raw data provides a fascinating
pool of possible explanations and opens the door for further research to answer the many
lingering questions as to why minor league teams and stadiums at some levels might be associated with
increases in per capita income.

VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this research highlight the positive effects of AAA teams, A+ teams, AA
stadiums, and rookie stadiums on local per capita income. The findings also indicate nonpositive effects of AA, A, A-, rookie, and independent teams as well as AAA, A+, A, A-, and
independent stadiums.
There are several reasons the positive effects are particularly interesting. First, and in
contrast to decades of major league results, there are no significant negative effects. All of the
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significant results are positive. In addition, the a priori expectations based on a thorough
conceptual analysis were that all of the results would be negative.
To be clear, teams and stadiums in the majority of classifications have insignificant
effects on per capita income. This is consistent with prior major league research. What is
unique about the minor league context is that entire leagues of teams at the AAA and A+ levels
are, for the first time, reflecting positive changes. Yet, no cost-benefit analysis was conducted so
there is no implication that cities should invest in AA or rookie stadiums. What is distinctive
about these results is the acknowledgement that perhaps fundamental differences in the business
structure of sports can result in dramatic changes in the ability of sports teams to affect their
local economies.
Considerable work is still necessary to refine our understanding of the effects of minor
league sports on local economies. The positive effect of some classifications of minor league
baseball may not be unique to the sport of baseball. Minor leagues in hockey are nearly as
extensive and may well generate similar effects. European leagues that operate on promotion
and relegation have even more “minor” leagues. English football, for example, has over 140
leagues in over 20 different levels. Many of these teams are located in cities not dissimilar to
minor league baseball cities, suggesting a positive effect may exist there as well. Other
academicians are encouraged to further pursue this line of research.
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TABLE 1
Franchise Volatility as Measured by the Number of Years in an MSA

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Minimum
Maximum

AAA
17.23
1.53
19
1
27

Affiliated Classification
AA
A+
A
A13.57 18.76 15.64 15.06
1.19
1.44
1.24
1.37
12
20
14
15
2
1
1
1
27
27
27
27

R
16.85
2.01
18
3
27

IND
4.61
0.33
3
1
14

Note. All minor league teams in the 27 year period between 1980 and 2006.
a

Excludes minor league teams playing in far suburbs of very large MSAs that are not reflective of their

true market size.

TABLE 2
MSA Characteristics by Minor League Baseball Classification, 2006

MLB

5,794,493

% playing in
cities with any
major league
team
100%

AAA
AA
All A's
A+
A
ARookie
Ind.

1,188,280
569,885
466,078
516,165
426,144
455,925
171,694
632,672

38%
11%
19%
20%
13%
24%
0%
33%

Average
populationa

% playing in
cities with a
MLB team

Average
stadium
age (years)

100%

23

Average
stadium
seating
capacity
44,774

3%
4%
16%
15%
10%
24%
0%
33%

21
16
26
33
20
26
32
28

12,773
7,519
5,477
5,784
5,849
4,799
3,382
4,995
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Average
games played
per season
161
143
140
117
138
138
75
72
na

TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Dependent Variable
Real per capita income (2006)
Local Market Variables
Lagged real per capita income (2006)
Percent change in population
Rate of employment
Stadium capacity
Quality of MLB affiliation
Number of NFL franchises
Number of NBA franchises
Number of NHL franchises
Number of MLB franchises
Minor League Variables
Number of affiliated franchises
Number of AAA franchises
Number of AA franchises
Number of A franchises (all)
Number of A+ franchises
Number of A franchises
Number of A- franchises
Number of rookie franchises
Number of independent franchises
Any stadium honeymoon
AAA stadium honeymoon
AA stadium honeymoon
All A stadium honeymoon
A+ stadium honeymoon
A stadium honeymoon
A- stadium honeymoon
Rookie stadium honeymoon
Independent stadium honeymoon
AAA entry honeymoon
AA entry honeymoon
A entry honeymoon
Rookie entry honeymoon
Independent entry honeymoon
AAA exit honeymoon
AA exit honeymoon
A exit honeymoon
Rookie exit honeymoon
Independent exit honeymoon

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

27393.82

5226.83

12782

74281

27037.37
0.010150
0.471758
4074.781
1410783
0.0365
0.0372
0.0174
0.0170

5122.35
0.013871
0.070982
5570.446
2288318
0.187495
0.189373
0.130694
0.129275

12617
-0.244
0.234
0
0
0
0
0
0

71042
0.105
0.663
76273
15600000
1
1
1
1

0.5342
0.0984
0.1083
0.2595
0.0817
0.1054
0.0724
0.0680
0.0930
0.0252
0.0206
0.0244
0.0372
0.0094
0.0204
0.0074
0.0078
0.0118
0.0138
0.0235
0.0487
0.0143
0.0676
0.0099
0.0229
0.0414
0.0071
0.0737

0.547440
0.297826
0.310774
0.449190
0.286271
0.307128
0.264256
0.295718
0.295042
0.156778
0.142144
0.154444
0.189373
0.096294
0.141498
0.085991
0.088151
0.108181
0.116467
0.151472
0.215263
0.118834
0.251098
0.099169
0.149657
0.199334
0.083773
0.261340

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3
1
1
3
3
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Note. Although the model is first-differenced before estimation, the un-differenced values are reported here
since the interpretation of the coefficients is the same regardless of first-differencing, as described
in the Analysis section.

TABLE 4
Effects of the Presence of Minor League Baseball Teams on Per Capita Income, 19852006
Model
First-differenced variables
Lagged real per capita income
Percent change in population
Rate of employment
Stadium capacity
Quality of MLB affiliation
Number of NFL franchises
Number of NBA franchises
Number of NHL franchises
Number of MLB franchises
Number of affiliated franchises

1
-0.1269*
0.060
-11278.4***
3336.283
41067.55***
2759.098
-0.0055
0.0047
0.000002
0.000008
-8.044
140.393
69.481
63.364
33.635
102.373
151.260
91.157
35.099
21.495

Number of AAA franchises
Number of AA franchises
Number of A franchises (all)

2
-0.1279*
0.060
-11244.1***
3332.758
41105.41***
2745.166
-0.0057
0.0047
0.000002
0.000008
-20.685
141.631
55.120
62.313
30.440
102.925
170.490
92.734

3
-0.1297*
0.059
-11139.6***
3319.176
41323.91***
2730.243
-0.0056
0.0047
0.000002
0.000008
-13.781
140.911
50.738
62.100
16.182
102.528
172.485
93.425

4
-0.1305*
0.059
-11148.5***
3316.134
41335.76***
2715.703
-0.0061
0.0047
0.000001
0.000008
-14.222
140.589
52.721
61.945
13.709
102.417
172.769
93.419

5
-0.1315*
0.059
-11124.8***
3311.445
41401.12***
2703.199
-0.0064
0.0047
0.000002
0.000008
-22.505
141.754
60.424
63.658
13.350
102.991
182.462
94.881

65.016*
30.412
78.482*
35.048
28.013
22.252

66.031*
30.237
75.327*
34.188

70.486*
32.652
55.270
35.840

67.245*
31.781
60.789
37.122

110.088
57.337
9.380
29.936
-45.233
33.042
-10.374
33.693
29.928
44.839
2.278

123.626*
59.092
-2.548
32.723
-43.859
33.676
-28.504
35.278
22.359
45.318

117.567*
58.320
-12.375
34.794
-52.268
33.796
-22.967
35.134
-19.604
76.387

Number of A+ franchises
Number of A franchises
Number of A- franchises
Number of rookie franchises
Number of ind. franchises
Any stadium honeymoon

29.010
44.716
3.662

-9.351
33.835
30.605
44.848
1.606

36

Model
First-differenced variables

1
54.564

2
54.546

3
54.618

AAA stadium honeymoon
AA stadium honeymoon
A+ stadium honeymoon
A stadium honeymoon
A- stadium honeymoon
Rookie stadium honeymoon
Ind. stadium honeymoon

4

5

-16.238
89.445
95.367
57.975
-94.691
57.975
68.287
50.170
-2.923
73.721
179.708*
88.020
71.508
103.974

-2.897
113.605
160.828*
75.279
-110.886
75.279
56.599
52.108
-14.511
74.547
201.992*
93.954
53.510
99.734
-22.145
151.672
-115.007
77.547
24.710
35.627
-49.552
71.528
55.081
97.399
-36.588
77.173
51.987
52.223
-34.962
39.095
-156.032
91.280
-14.154
50.384
0.34
5,236

AAA entry honeymoon
AA entry honeymoon
A entry honeymoon
Rookie entry honeymoon
Independent entry honeymoon
AAA exit honeymoon
AA exit honeymoon
A exit honeymoon
Rookie exit honeymoon
Independent exit honeymoon
R2
Observations

0.33
5,236

0.33
5,236

0.34
5,236

0.34
5,236

Note. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are below the estimated coefficients.
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%
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TABLE 5
Robustness Check for Four Significant Minor League Variables
AAA Team

A+ Team AA Stadium

Rookie Stadium

Original Sample
Fully Specified
(Model 5)

67.245*
31.781

117.567*
58.320

160.828*
75.279

201.992*
93.954

Without Capacity and
MLB Quality

67.771*
31.773

117.597*
58.263

159.6239*
75.290

203.407*
93.979

Without Entry and Exit

70.486*
32.652

123.626*
59.092

95.367
57.975

179.708*
88.020

62.100
32.646

110.531
57.831

148.38474*
72.882

203.885*
93.889

Different Sample
Without Entry and Exit
1980-2006

67.915*
28.497

86.355
49.811

95.827
51.594

182.664*
85.750

With Attendance
1992-2006

95.088*
39.703

101.514
85.158

238.895
131.686

158.362
119.846

Without Lagged
Dependent Variable

Note. Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are below the estimated coefficients.
* Significant at 5%

TABLE 6
Summary of the Effects of Major and Minor League Baseball on Real Per Capita Income
Stadium
MLB
AAA
AA
All A's
A+
A
ARookie
Ind.

Team

--

--

-+, p < 0.05
----+, p < 0.05
--

+, p < 0.05
--+, p < 0.05
-----

Note. Major league results from Coates and Humphreys (1999). Insignificance noted by --.
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